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In her recent article, “Women, the State, and War,” in a special issue of this journal discussing the thought of Kenneth Waltz, Jean Elsthain asserts that she was “never entirely convinced that defining the state as a gendered category helped us to account for very much where statecraft and war were concerned,” and concludes that, across Waltz’s three levels of analysis, “there is no compelling evidence of gender determination.” ​[1]​  While acknowledging that feminist work has contributed to understanding the empirical realities of women’s subordination, including but not limited to sexual exploitation, wartime rape, and sex-selective abortion, Elsthain distinguishes usefulness of that analysis from the less useful identification of “man, the state, and war” as gendered.​[2]​  She asks: “does ‘gender’ as a category of analysis or as the central feature of a logic of explanation alter in significant ways Kenneth Waltz’s famous ‘levels of analysis’…?” and answers in the negative.​[3]​
Though feminist scholars have critiqued the gender-exclusivity of using the “levels of analysis” to frame International Relations (IR) theorizing,​[4]​  this article takes as a starting point Elsthain’s assertion that they can provide leverage on the question of whether (and how) gender analysis significantly changes IR theorizing. However, I use very different tools to think about this question, and (perhaps relatedly, though not necessarily) come up with a different answer.  Particularly, the account of gender as a category of analysis in the article omits (both in substance and in citation) the great majority of feminist work in IR and (likely as a result) does not reflect that work’s complicated understandings of the meaning of gender and its role in global politics.​[5]​ This article looks to evaluate the utility of using gender to think about global politics at Waltz’s three levels of analysis, acknowledging the contributions of feminist work in IR.​[6]​  After introducing gender as a category of analysis, this article looks at people, the state, and the international system, in Elshtain’s terms, “what does ‘putting gender in’ do, if anything?”​[7]​	
Genderings
Elshtain defines feminist analysis as work that “pushes a feminist agenda of one sort or the other.”​[8]​   After defining feminist scholarship in terms of itself, she describes feminist work in three categories: work linking gender subordination with human nature, work taking universalist approaches to women’s rights, and work that rejects universalism for radical relativism.​[9]​ Elshtain translates this to her perception of feminist arguments in IR: 
Feminist thinkers, with few exceptions, hold that either increasing the number of women in positions of power will alter the world of politics, domestic and foreign, or that states that have undergone what might be called a ‘feminist transformation’ will engage one another in ways that are visibly different from the ‘male dominant’ state; or, finally, that transformed states will then encounter one another in a different sort of global arena, one in which ‘soft power’, said to be favored overwhelmingly by women, pertains, and all ‘militarism’ has been eradicated.​[10]​ 

Elshtain explains that all positions agree that “all pre-feminist IR theory is suspect because of its systematic gender bias.”​[11]​ While she acknowledges that discrimination against women is “overdetermined” in global social life, Elshtain does not see it as being “determinative” in either the structure or practice of international politics.​[12]​  
	In order to evaluate whether gender is “substantial” or even “determinative” in global politics,​[13]​ it is important to have a fuller understanding of the meaning of gender and the focus of feminist scholarship in IR than what Elshtain’s article provides. Though Elshtain is correct that feminist theorizing in IR is not limited to what she calls the “empirical realities of women in political life, national or international,”​[14]​ her article largely ignores the contemporary subject matter and approaches of most feminist IR. This problem manifests in three main ways.  First, Elshtain uses “gender” as a synonym either for “women/femininity” or the differences between “women” and “men,” rather than exploring, as much feminist scholarship has, the difference between sex and gender, the complicated construction of gender, and the multiple and interacting layers of gendering in global politics. Second, the understanding of feminism in the article, despite being referenced as current, is outdated, focuses on anomalous or radical examples, and presents oversimplified versions of complex theoretical traditions. Third, Elshtain argues that gender can matter in “empirical realities of women’s lives” but not in the constitution of the state and the international system; implying that gender can be determinative for women’s lives, but not for the statecraft and warcraft  This treatment (improperly, as many feminists understand it) assumes that “the state” and “war” can be conceptually or empirically separated from women’s lives. 
	Even early feminist IR treated gender as more than the differences between men and women at the individual level or the discrimination against women at the state level. In the introduction to their 1991 book, Grant and Newland (citing feminist philosopher of science Sandra Harding) describe gender as “a systematic social construction of masculinity and femininity that is little, if at all, constrained by biology.”​[15]​ In her 1992 monograph, Gender in International Relations, Ann Tickner (citing feminist theorist Joan Scott) explains gender as “a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes.”​[16]​ Following this early work, many feminists articulated sophisticated definitions of gender that include elements of post-structural theorizing, socio-biological understandings, and social construction, emphasizing power, interdependence, and relationality.​[17]​ 
	There are several elements common to most feminist IR understandings of gender. The first is that “gender” is distinguishable from “sex.” If “sex” refers to the perceived membership in Elshtain’s categories of “male” or “female,”​[18]​ gender is “a system of symbolic meanings that creates social hierarchies based on perceived association with masculine and feminine characteristics.”​[19]​  The study of gender in political life is not the study of what men do and what women do and how they might be similar or different. Instead, it is the study of how social structures select for and value characteristics associated with masculinity and femininity, and how those selections and values influence the lives not only of “men” and “women” but of society more generally. Being “female” is not a (or the) indicator of gender, instead, masculinities and femininities are genders and produce genderings.  Individuals can be “gendered,” but so can institutions, organizations, and even states.  Gendering is about the distribution of power and regard based on perceived association with sex-based characteristics, rather than possession of certain sex organs a priori. In these understandings, gender is first, fundamentally social; second, an expression of power; and third, an organizing principle for politics and political thought.​[20]​ 
	It is gender as an organizing principle for politics and political thought that interests feminists in IR.  As Marysia Zalewsi explains:
The driving force of feminism is its attention to gender and not simply women. To be sure, for many feminists, the injustices done to women because of their sex is paramount, but the concept, nature, and practice of gender are key.​[21]​

Elshtain’s characterization of feminists as interested in either adding women to the power structures of world politics or feminizing the current leaders, then, is unrepresentative. Instead, feminist scholars see themselves as looking at IR through “gendered lenses.”​[22]​  Scholarship through gender lenses looks for gender in policy formulations, military decisions, the distribution of resources, social and economic status, leadership, and other areas of the international arena.​[23]​  Elshtain’s defining “feminist scholarship” as “advancing a feminist agenda” asserts implies that feminist work is political while (some or all) other work is not. Feminists in IR would accept that their work commits to ending gender subordination and to seeing global politics from the margins, but Elshtain wrongly characterizes other work as apolitical.​[24]​  Feminists have argued that the difference between the epistemology of feminist work and other work in IR is not that feminism has a politics, but that it acknowledges its political content.  More to the point, ignoring relationships between the knower and the known generally and of gender specifically does not make IR scholarship gender-neutral or objective.
	Feminist scholars’ engagement with the relationship between the knower and the known reveals the third misunderstanding in Elshtain’s explanation of the field. While Elshtain concedes that gender discrimination impacts women’s lives, she distinguishes the importance of gender to women’s lives from the question of whether global politics is gendered.  In making this claim, Elshtain asserts that gender discrimination that impacts women’s lives can be separated from the nature of the state and international system, and from the determinants and causes of war therein. Feminists in IR have consistently argued both that women’s lives are not just lived in global politics, but of global politics, and that the discrimination women experience interlinked with the existence and causes of structural and physical violence in the international arena. Particularly, feminists have argued that patriarchal social organization​[25]​ in global politics is a principle cause not only of women’s subordination, but also empire-building and globalization, among other international processes.​[26]​ These approaches see that the gendering of women’s lives cannot be separated from the gendering of “man, the state, and war,” generally or in terms of the meanings and causes of war specifically. 
	Feminist scholarship in IR, then, does not pursue a line of research arguing that the differences between “women” and “men” are significant at all three “levels” of analysis. Instead, feminists have argued that the power relations between gendered constructions and institutions “significantly alter” all three levels of analysis and their interaction. Gender is a “structural feature of social and political life” that “profoundly shapes our place in, and view of, the world.”​[27]​ Feminist scholars characterize gender as “necessary, conceptually, for understanding international relations; important in analyzing causes and predicting outcomes; and essential to thinking about solutions and promoting positive change.”​[28]​  Contrary to Elshtain’s claim, this means that pre-feminist (or non-feminist) scholarship is not “suspect” or valueless but necessarily incomplete. This clearer, updated, and more complex understanding of the meaning of gender and the mission of feminist work is certainly suited to evaluating contributions to the study of IR at Waltz’s three levels. Still, it remains important not to assume feminists’ belief that “putting gender in” produces “new insights, theoretical advances, and conceptual categories “man, the state, and war” makes it so.​[29]​ The rest of this article turns to the theoretical and empirical evidence behind feminist claims to evaluate the relevance of gender analysis at each “image” of Waltzian theorizing.
“Man”​[30]​

Elshtain starts by analyzing Waltz’s “first image,” man.  Waltz saw human nature as the least important of the three images, arguing that its continuity makes it less interesting to study than the state or the system. Elshtain, however, sees that Waltz had difficulty dispensing with first-image pessimists such as Freud, Niehbur, and Augustine, whose work she finds compelling in its own right and suggestive of the first image’s importance. 
Elshtain asks whether gender analysis contributes to first-image theorizing.  She starts by criticizing feminists’ lack of engagement with first image pessimists, because she knows “of no first-image feminist analysis that approaches Freud, Niebuhr, and Augustine in its comprehensiveness or coherence.”​[31]​ Elshtain also critiques the substance she sees in feminist first-image arguments. She provides a few examples that she calls “reductionist,” including “emphasis on wombs as a way to peace,” “pleas for the reduction of the number of males in the population,” and “claims that ‘all men are rapist in situ.’”​[32]​  Elshtain expresses horror that, in her view, “ those were not marginal arguments – they were at the heart of the dominant radical feminist position in the 70s/80s.”​[33]​ 
Given that Elshtain sees these arguments as intellectually bankrupt, she finds it “unsurprising that serious students of gender and international relations often go to considerable pains to avoid first-image arguments.”​[34]​  When feminists do make first image arguments, Elshtain finds them problematic, as she explains: 
Each time a gender analyst suggests that should women take over the reins of government it would lead to a substantive alteration in how a state behaves, she laces together Waltz’s first and third image in a construction that is less than persuasive.​[35]​ 

Elshtain perceives that feminists are arguing that the difference between men’s nature and women’s nature affects the way that human nature impacts international politics.  She is not persuaded, seeing as: 
The case has not been made that ‘maleness’ and the international system there is a one way line of absolute causation ….[and] whatever the differences that pertain between men and women as embodied beings – and we know there are some – they are not decisive, finally, for how states behave, particularly in the international arena, Waltz’s central concern.”​[36]​ 

If Elshtain is unconvinced that sex matters in human nature’s effect on IR, she is also unconvinced that changes in either the sex of leadership or the gender-based characteristics we value in leaders will change the world.  She characterizes feminist scholars as advancing “naïve if well-meaning … simplistic formulations about changes of heart.”​[37]​  
	Contrary to Elshtain’s portrayal, feminist IR does not avoid first-image theorizing, either about human nature or about the role of individuals in global politics.  Feminists in IR have consistently claimed the gender lenses offer a unique understanding of the first image.​[38]​  Further, feminist arguments for “first-image” significance do not rely on integrating women into leadership. Instead, some feminists in IR have understood accounts of human nature that disregard gender as incomplete.​[39]​ Feminist scholars also contend that gender affects first-image scholars’ choice of subject when they study “man” or “the individual.”​[40]​ Finally, feminists provide a link between “people” and “the system” that, instead of relying on adding more women to leadership, understands the international system as interdependent with its most vulnerable members.​[41]​ The remainder of this section goes over each of these contributions to first-image theorizing. 
	The first dimension of first-image theorizing is the question of the role of human nature in global politics.  Even the earliest work in feminist IR argued that gender analysis matters in the study of human nature in global politics. Tickner, in her 1988 critique of Hans Morgenthau’s principles of political realism, argued that the pessimist view of human nature  was “rooted in assumption about human nature and morality that, in modern Western culture, are associated with masculinity.”​[42]​ Particularly, feminists see the gendered dichotomies of our understandings of human capacities, where masculine/feminine is related to strong/weak, autonomous/interdependent, rational/emotional, competitive/cooperative, and public/private. Feminists observe that, often, realists’ conceptions of human nature privilege the side of these dichotomies associated with masculinity while discounting the characteristics associated with femininity, relying on “the social construction of hegemonic masculinity and its opposition to devalued femininity.”​[43]​ Tickner explains that, at best, a concept of human nature that privileges traits associated with masculinity only tells a partial story:
A feminist perspective believes that objectivity, as it is culturally defined, is associated with masculinity. Therefore, supposedly ‘objective’ laws of human nature are based on a partial masculine view of human nature. Human nature is both masculine and feminine; it contains elements of social reproduction and development as well as political domination.​[44]​

Criticisms of first-image pessimism, however, have not led feminist IR to adopt a liberal individualistic understanding of human nature.  Sarah Brown, in another early contribution to feminist IR, argued that such an approach relies on the gendered dichotomy of reason and emotion, awarding individuals political agency and rights on the basis of their ability to reason.​[45]​ As a result, liberal approaches to gender are left to “roam confusedly between the pursuit of liberty and the pursuit of justice, juggling with incoherent strategies which simultaneously assert women’s sameness to and difference from men.”​[46]​
	Rejecting both negative and individualistic approaches to human nature, feminist theorists have drawn on women’s experiences and gender analysis to sketch alternative visions.  Starting with evidence that sometimes women are assigned obligations that they do not freely assume (contra social contract theorizing), Nancy Hirschmann sees humans as relationally, rather than radically, autonomous, where people maintain individual identity but make choices within the constraints of partial autonomy and human interdependence.​[47]​ Tickner proposes a hybrid approach that sees human nature as a combination of characteristics traditionally associated with masculinity and the characteristics associated with femininity that they often overshadow.​[48]​  Other feminist scholars, combining these understandings, opt to see human behavior as fluidly connected to dominant (gendered) social norms rather than stabilized by some sort of constant nature.​[49]​ Each of these approaches has obvious and potentially important implications for the role of “man” in statecraft and warcraft. 
	The second dimension of feminist contributions to first-image theorizing is dialogues with and criticism of traditional first-image scholarship that looks at the role of individuals in global politics.​[50]​  Looking through gendered lenses, feminists have argued that most first-image work in IR 
Look[s] only at the individual with elite power to explain international relations, and even then they look only at the male individual with elite power. While this perspective widens the international relations spectrum to include individuals, the narrowness of the individuals that it includes limits its effectiveness as an interpretive framework and reproduces the gender, class, and race biases in system-level international relations scholarship. Further, while ‘individuals’ matter … [to some IR scholars], their interdependence and relationships do not – they appear to act alone, without reliance on each other, and with a complete set of choices.​[51]​

Feminist scholars have suggested that the spectrum of individuals seen to “matter” in global politics should be expanded. Feminist work often starts from theorizing even the most dispossessed women’s lives from the “bottom up,” and theorizing the other levels of analysis through the lenses of what they learn from those women’s lives.​[52]​ 
This work however, is not, as Elshtain assumes, primarily about how gender subordination influences women’s lives.  Instead, feminists have provided empirical evidence that the gendered experiences of marginalized people, particularly women, in global politics, impact global politics more broadly. For example, Katherine Moon pointed out that the United States’ military aid to South Korea was once conditioned on the availability of legal, disease-tested prostitutes.​[53]​ Feminist scholars have demonstrated the importance both of actual Afghan women’s lives and public representations of their experiences in shaping the United States military deployment in Afghanistan.​[54]​  That is, feminists in IR have provided evidence not just that Afghan women live in gendered worlds, but also that those gendered worlds are bound up in why the war in Afghanistan happened.  They make this argument not as a unique causality argument for “the war” in Afghanistan, but as a structural argument for the cause of war generally. Feminist work has shown that women combatants impact both understandings and outcomes of conflicts as diverse as those in Northern Ireland and Rwanda.​[55]​ These case studies show that first-image theorizing’s relevance to global politics should not be limited to focusing on human nature. Instead, feminists have argued that war theorizing should recognize the myriad of ways that people generally, and people at the margins specifically, influence global politics.
	The third contribution that feminist theorists have made to first-image theorizing is problematizing the very distinctions made between “man, the state, and war” in IR. While Elshtain accuses feminists of mixing the first and third levels by arguing that adding women to state leadership will improve the world, feminist theorists’ actual arguments about the relationships between images have had a different focus, contending that:
Read forward, “the personal is international” insofar as ideas about what it means to be a ‘respectable’ woman or an ‘honorable’ man have been shaped by colonizing policies, trading strategies, and military doctrines … the implications a feminist understanding of international politics are thrown into sharper relief when one reads “the personal is international” the other way round: the international is personal. This calls for a radical new imagining of what it takes for governments to ally with each other, compete with, and wage war with each other.​[56]​ 

In other words, the state and international system impact and shape individuals’ lives, while individuals themselves play an essential role in the content and activities of the state and the international system.  In Moon’s work, for example, it is not only that Korean prostitutes’ bodies were the subject of negotiations about the United States’ willingness to defend South Korea, but also that negotiations between the two governments dictated when those were forced to undergo sexually transmitted disease testing and whether they would work in racially segregated or integrated brothels.​[57]​  Feminist scholars have argued that such examples demonstrate that the individual, state, and, international “images” of international politics are not only linked, but ontologically interdependent. 
	Returning to Elsthain’s framework, then, there are two questions to be addressed: Is first-image theorizing important? And is gender important to first-image theorizing? Feminist work in IR provides additional evidence for Elshtain’s contention that the first-image is an important piece of the puzzle of global politics.  Where I disagree with Elshtain is in answering the second question. Elshtain argues that feminists have avoided first-image theorizing and engaged the “individual” in the meaning and causes of war only unconvincingly.  Evidence from twenty years of feminist work in IR, however, I argue, makes a different case. Feminist work shows that there are importantly gendered elements to both pessimistic and liberal understandings of human nature used in thinking about how wars are made and prevented, and proposes more comprehensive accounts inspired by gender analysis. Feminist work in IR has shown, both theoretically and empirically, that many of the field’s representations of the individuals that impact global politics are gendered.  Gender lenses have uniquely demonstrated that it is not only elite men who impact the making and outcomes of conflicts, but also people (particularly women) at the margins of the global power structures.​[58]​ Further, feminist scholarship has deconstructed the divide between “personal” and “political” in the state and war, demonstrating that the “first image” and the other “levels” are not only interlinked, as Elshtain proposes, but intersubjective, where “not only subjects (women and marginalized men), but also concepts, desires, tastes …can be feminized – with the effect of reducing their  [ideological and material] legitimacy, status, and value.​[59]​ Without “gendering” “man,” these insights would be unavailable to improve the breadth and depth of first-image theorizing.
The State 

Elshtain next addresses the importance of second level to understanding war and statecraft. Particularly, Elshtain is interested in the proposition “that ‘good’ states are less likely to war with one another, thus reducing the flash points that erupt into violence.  When she asks if gender impacts the characteristics of states cause their war-making to vary, Elshtain concludes that “there is no compelling evidence of gender determination.”​[60]​ She reaches this conclusion by exploring the flaws she sees in feminist theorizing of the state, which she characterizes as 
woefully inadequate in its consideration of state systems because the overriding assumption was that all states are patriarchal, ergo oppressive of women, and liberal democratic states might be the worst of all because they somehow disguise this fact.​[61]​

Elshtain follows this oversimplification of feminist theorizing about the state by criticizing the support of some Marxist feminists for the Soviet system during the Cold War.  Again (mis)representing radical and Marxist feminism as evil and nihilistic, Elshtain returns to “an earlier generation of women activists” to see if feminist theorizing about the state can be salvaged.​[62]​ What follows is an interesting, if vague, discussion of women Progressives in the World War I era who argued that either women should control legislatures or men should engage in the activities (such as mothering) that make women more peaceful. Elshtain is particularly interested in Jane Addams’ “far more sophisticated” version of this argument, which claimed that “certain practices women engage in are essential to forming the sort of state that will refrain from war.”​[63]​ Still, Elshtain rejects Addams’ argument, criticizing its reliance on an analogy to immigration that requires a higher governmental authority between states.
	By discarding the feminist arguments about the state in 1970s and 1980s radical and Marxist feminism, and exploring and then rejecting earlier work, Elshtain concludes that, though “the second image cannot be dispensed with all together,” gender is irrelevant to the question of what makes a “good state” that is less likely to make war.​[64]​  While I think that Elshtain dispenses too quickly with Marxist feminist approaches as well as Addams’ argument, the remainder of this section makes an easier case for the relevance of gender to second-image theorizing by exploring post-Cold War feminist thought in IR that Elshtain does not engage.
	Elshtain rejects feminist IR’s claim that the state is “gendered.”  I argue that, in evaluating the question of whether or not the state is “gendered,”  it is crucial to explore the reasoning behind the claim in order to evaluate if and how gender matters to second-image theorizing. Some feminists in IR have presented compelling statistical evidence that domestic gender equality is an independently significant variable in predicting which (“good”) states refrain from wars, controlling for democracy, trade, and cultural similarity.​[65]​ Still, most feminists have resisted reducing second-image theorizing about war to the question of “good states” responsible for peace and “bad states” as sources of danger.  Instead, many feminist theorists have studied both the nature of the state and the range of its behaviors towards other states.  Neither, feminists have argued, can be fully understood without reference to gender. As R. W. Connell has observed, “there is a gendered configuring of recruitment and promotion, a gendered configuring of the internal division of labor, a gendered configuring of policymaking, of practical routines, and of ways of mobilizing pleasure and consent” in the structure and function of states.​[66]​ This evidence has led feminists to wonder if the “state” is necessarily gendered and its meanings are necessarily embedded in the gendered experiences of male theorists and practitioners.​[67]​ Particularly, various feminist scholars see gender as “altering in significant ways” the philosophical warrants for the state, the leadership of the state, the portrayal of the state in IR theory as a rational and unitary actor, state militarism, and state nationalism. 
	Feminists have argued that gender is salient in the philosophical basis of the state. As Carole Pateman has noted, many social contract theorists allocated women different roles than men while failing to deal with the ways that reproduction would have interrupted the operations of their visions of un-governed society.​[68]​ Both explicitly and as a result of their partial views of social, social contract theorists often excluded women and femininity from explanations of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.​[69]​ The impacts of gendering citizenship include women’s actual exclusion from political life and the construction of the gendered public/private dichotomy.​[70]​ There, the “public realm, …where power and authority are exercised, is regarded as the natural province of men; while the private world is seen as the appropriate domain of women.”​[71]​ As a result, “the things that happen in private spaces (such as domestic violence or marital rape) have been treated as private matters beyond the control or authority of the state,” and therefore received less attention.​[72]​ The gendered nature of the philosophical foundation of the state influences states’ policy priorities and the allocation of states’ resources among their citizens, both of which have bearing not only on states’ individual decisions to make wars but also on the existence of states of war more generally. 
	Feminists have also noted that states’ leaders are mainly men and mainly masculine.​[73]​ Women have been and remain underrepresented in political leadership in every state in the world throughout human history. Despite current, record-high representation, women remain less than 20 percent of the world’s parliamentarians, and less than fifteen percent of the world’s holders of executive office, cabinet posts, and judicial seats. State masculinity, however, is not reducible to men’s leadership of states.  Instead, men continue to lead states because states and their citizens select for characteristics associated with masculinity (assertiveness, coarseness, toughness, aggressiveness, sternness, activeness, rationality, and confidence) over characteristics associated with femininity (warmth, gentleness, sensitivity, emotion, interconnectivity, and cautiousness) when they select their leaders. Men and women privilege masculinity regardless of the physical sex of leaders.​[74]​ As a result, feminists explain, the institutional structures of the state manifest gender subordination and “state identity often depends on the manipulation of gender.”​[75]​ There are two impacts of this observation: the “empirical reality” (in Elshtain’s terms) of the exclusion of women and femininity from control (and spoils) of the state, and states’ propensities to act according to the masculine traits that influence leadership selections. The latter would have serious implications for interstate relations, even if the former did not. 
	A third way that feminists have seen gender in the “state” is in Waltzian neorealists’ tendencies to portray states as “abstract unitary actors whose actions are explained ….according to some higher rationality presented as independent of human agency.”​[76]​ However, feminists have observed that “characterizations of state behavior in terms of self-help, autonomy, and power seeking privilege characteristics associated … masculinity.”​[77]​  This means that “models of IR [and the causes of war] have been built on assumptions of a rigid boundary between inside and outside, anarchy and order, foreign and domestic.”​[78]​  These models portray the “outside” as a dangerous space. Even as these models have been deconstructed in some IR work, characteristics associated with femininity have not been recognized in more complex views of the state, and analysis of the influence of gender remains marginal.​[79]​ Instead, feminist work has revealed rationality as a partial, stereotypically masculine view of state decision-making that ignores (the feminine characteristic of) emotion and shown that states’ interests are far from unitary. Characterizing states as rational, unitary actors reifies understandings of state identity and interest that represent only narrow portions of states’ populations. Particularly, feminists suggest that “the boundaries between inside and outside, order and anarchy evoke gendered constructions of self and other that privilege hegemonic constructions of masculinity.”​[80]​ Feminists have criticized the implications of these arguments for understanding individual subjectivity. Particularly,  
Feminists’ concern for the political margins inspires the insight that states are not monolithic entities, but diverse amalgamations of people and experiences ….the state is not an agent but a compilation of agents. Some agents within a state are represented in the state’s political decisions while others are not.​[81]​

While some theorists disregard the insecure people inside of secure states either by presuming order “inside” the state or by arguing for a utilitarian approach to security and resource provision, feminists argue that this instrumentalizes individuals, particularly at the margins of global politics.​[82]​  If, for example, as feminists have argued, states and state structures (sometimes) benefit from wars, but women are disproportionately negatively affected, than the interests of women in a state can be different from the interests of the state “as a whole” should such a thing exist.​[83]​  Arguing that state interests are not only diverse but sometimes internally contradictory, feminists contend that failure to understand the state as gendered allows those in power to adjudicate these conflicts in their interests to maintain the appearance of state unity.  This feminist argument has two potential implications: that the state is more complicated, less unified, and less representative than it is often portrayed in neorealist theory, and that states’ decisions and interactions can be understood with reference to the gendered identities implicit in the framing of state behavior as rational and unified.​[84]​  It is important to understand that this critique is different than the criticisms that Waltzian neorealism does not explain specific wars (which Waltz rejects because he explicitly states that his approach is system, rather than being a theory of foreign policy). The feminist argument that gender hierarchy impacts state behavior is an argument not about individual state choices, but about the nature of states doing the choosing; therefore, it is a theory of the state’s role in the system, rather than a (here, irrelevant) theory of foreign policy. 
    	  Feminists have argued that state militarism is more evidence that the state and its war decisions (generally and specifically) are both gendered and gender-constitutive.  Militarism is “the processes by which characteristically military practices are extended into the civilian arena” by extension of war-related, war-preparatory, and war-based meanings and activities into political life.​[85]​  Feminists have argued that state militarism is not gender-neutral, natural, or automatic.​[86]​ Instead, gender differentiated roles are both demanded and reified by militarization, as 
Men are under constant pressure to prove their manhood by being tough, adversarial, and aggressive …in one highly legitimated and organized institution within most societies, men not only can, but – to be successful – must prove their masculinity …. women must be properly subservient to meet the needs of militaries.​[87]​

Because militarism requires men to be willing to kill and die on behalf of their state (and the innocent women inside it) while women simultaneously serve as the feminized other in need of protection and the reproducers of masculine soldiers, many IR feminists see it as impossible to understand state militarism without conceptualizing it as gendered and see it as impossible to understand war and/or wars without understanding state militarism.​[88]​  The gendered nature of militarism has implications for the gendered nature of the state, since militaries and their signifiers are among the few features that are pervasive across states.​[89]​ As such, failing to understand the state as gendered means losing explanatory power in terms of state identities and behaviors. 
	Understanding gendered militarism is even more important, feminists argue, because its links to state nationalism, which
is a set of discourses about who “we” are and who belongs in the political community … Nationalism therefore depends upon “national chauvinism” such that members of other nations as well as racial, sexual, or ideological others inside the nation are constructed in terms of femininity or subordinate masculinity. These others are weak and inferior, or they are hypermasculine ….nationalist discourses that constitute the identity of the nation are predicated upon discourses of gender that reproduce traditional gender roles.​[90]​

Particularly, feminists see that “gender difference between women and men serves to symbolically define the limits of national difference.”​[91]​ In other words, gender differentiation among states is a cause of war.  Gendered nationalism shapes state identity and differentiates among states in the international arena through women’s bodies, as they are constructed as biological and cultural reproducers of the nation.​[92]​ In these nationalist discourses, it is crucial that women serve as women (particularly as mothers) to insure national security and pride. The observation of gendered nationalism, then, might have two implications for second-image theorizing of war. First, it provides evidence that the state identity is tied to state gender identity, and therefore identity-based state war decisions are tied to state gender identities. Second, if feminist scholars are right that states uses gender metaphors (or, as Spike Peterson recently called it, “feminization as devalorization”)​[93]​ in their nationalist contests, gender accounts for how states’ identities influence their interaction and even their propensity to make wars.




	Elshtain is skeptical of Waltz’s emphasis on the systemic level, arguing that war cannot happen without the consideration of the other two levels.​[94]​ Elshtain expresses concern both that system-level analysis cannot account for change and that it risks giving states moral equivalence, which “shuns consideration of the issue of justice, liberty, and equality.”​[95]​ Still, Elshtain acknowledges that systemic theorizing not entirely irrelevant because of anarchy.​[96]​
	Having established the role of  third-image theorizing, Elshtain asks if gender matters to systemic analysis.  She inquires, specifically, about the utility of gender in light of anarchy, asking, “on the level of the state as an actor in an allegedly ‘anarchic’ realm, what does ‘putting gender in’ do, if anything?”​[97]​  While reiterating that “’putting gender in’ helps us to focus on all sorts of empirical data and to look at issues ‘on the ground’ in a way we might not otherwise,” she argues that:
Feminists who argue that gender is determinative in the causal sense in ‘why war?’ have failed to make their case, even as studies of gender internationally and domestically have enhanced our knowledge in salutary ways.​[98]​ 

	The line Elshtain is implicitly drawing is between knowing about women’s lives and knowing about the causes of war generally and/or wars specifically. Elshtain’s claim addresses two elements of systemic theorizing: the relationship between gender and the international system generally, and the role (or lack thereof) of gender in the causal story which leads to the making and fighting of war.  While Elshtain does not elaborate on which feminist work has failed to make the case, the remainder of this section engages her claim by exploring feminist work in IR that argues that gender “alters in significant ways” thinking about Waltz “third image.” Feminist IR has argued that “putting gender in” impacts how we understand war by arguing that war is gendered, by critiquing system-focused theorizing, by claiming that gender hierarchy is a structural element of global politics, and by hypothesizing that gender hierarchy is international structure in the Waltzian sense. 
	Feminists have explored the links between masculinity, femininity, and war. Feminists have argued that gender inequality is a predictor of war, that gender is key to war’s justificatory narratives, that war planning and preparation is fundamentally gendered, that war’s impacts are consistently gender-disproportionate, and that gender analysis reconceptualizes war.  First, as I mentioned above, feminist theorists have presented evidence that domestic gender equality is a predictor of states’ likelihood to make wars, suggesting that states that treat women fairly are more likely to be able to settle international disputes peacefully.​[99]​ 
Second, feminists have pointed out how justificatory narratives for wars tell stories of the “good guys” defeating the “bad guys” with demonstrable bravery and suffering to win the “good fight” for those innocent persons “back home.”​[100]​ These war stories emphasize the duty of a “just warrior” who sacrifices himself for the good of “women, children, and other vulnerable groups“ back home.​[101]​  Given this, a number of scholars see that gender-based expectations of human behavior have long been central to narratives justifying or explaining wars.​[102]​ Feminists have suggested that war cannot be understood without the gendered notion of protection used to inspire male soldiers to fight wars.​[103]​  Particularly, feminists have identified gender as a fundamental element in just war theorizing generally,​[104]​ and in the specific justificatory stories states used similar gender-based stories in the justificatory narratives for the First World War,​[105]​ the Cold War,​[106]​ the First Gulf War,​[107]​ the conflict in the former Yugoslavia,​[108]​  the conflict between Russia and Chechnya,​[109]​ and the “war on terror” in Afghanistan​[110]​  and Iraq.​[111]​ 
	Feminists have further provided evidence that these gendered impacts are not coincidental but intrinsically linked to war’s possibility.  The gender stereotypes that justify war also persuade people (mostly men) to fight in those wars.  Feminists have observed that cultural ideal-types often link masculinity, virility, and violence. Militaries have used explicitly sexist chants and challenges to train soldiers for generations. Several feminists have observed that, rather than just being incidental, this sexist language and behavior is endemic, because “militaries must work hard to turn men into soldiers, using misogynist training that it thought necessary to teach men to fight.”​[112]​ This training depends on establishing quality soldiering in opposition to femininity. It is not just that fighting wars is perceived as masculine, but that soldiering and protection becomes expected of men in order to maintain masculinity. While some men are actual protectors, and others remain potential protectors, the links between masculinity, citizenship, soldiering, and war remain strong.​[113]​ While Elshtain’s earlier work notes these links, recent feminist work how they are not incidental to or impacts of war, but instead fundamental to the justificatory logic of war generally. 
Feminists in IR have also pointed out that war’s impacts are consistently gendered. Specifically, there are a number of ways that militarism and war affect women that both provide evidence that was is gendered and cannot be accounted for without gendered analysis. A number of wartime atrocities specifically affect women, including sexual violence, wartime rape, and genocidal rape.​[114]​  Women consistently constitute the majority of civilian casualties in wars.​[115]​ Infrastructural damage caused by war-fighting often results in shortages in electricity, lack of access to clean water, halting of goods deliveries, decreased availability of essential household items, lower quality health care, less law enforcement at the neighborhood level, lower availability of jobs and lower pay at them, and other impacts which affect women in their roles as household runners differently, and often more severely, than men.​[116]​  While Elshtain might see these observations as part of the empirical contribution of gender analysis and not “altering in substantial ways” the third image, feminists have argued that these impacts are not merely reflective of pre-existing gender inequalities in society, but also productive of them and intrinisically interlinked.  In other words, from this perspective, instead of gender inequality making war gender-unequal, it is gender inequality that makes war that makes gender inequality.​[117]​
In addition to arguing that “war” is gendered, feminists have engaged with structural theorizing about the international system writ large.  Feminists have critiqued neorealist scholars’ focus on the “system,” questioning the foundational metaphor of  (neo)realist understandings of international anarchy. Ann Tickner recounts that “realists have applied his [Hobbes’] description of individuals’ behavior in a hypothetical pre-contractual state of nature, which Hobbes termed the war of everyman against everyman, to the behavior of states in the international system,”​[118]​ but that this is a flawed metaphor, because: 
Feminists have argued that such behavior could be applicable only to adult males, for if life was to go on for more than one generation in the state of nature, women must have been involved in activities such as reproduction and child rearing rather than in warfare. Reproductive activities require an environment that can provide for the survival of infants and behavior that is interactive and nurturing.​[119]​

As such, the “state of nature” can only be a war of everyman against everyman if it is timeless, without context, sexed male, and gendered masculine. Further, feminists have argued that fear of anarchy and gender hierarchy are intrinsically linked, and that “the dominance of men over women was based on the effort of men – as leaders of human society – to dominate nature.”​[120]​  In other words, if the international system is an anarchy which is inherently conflictual, gender hierarchy is implicated both in the existence of that system and in states’ performance of its mandates. Tickner has also noted that IR theorists are often selective in where they recognized anarchy, arguing that there is another (perhaps more significant) anarchy/order distinction in global politics, “the boundary between a public domestic place protected, at least theoretically, by the rule of law, and the private space of the family where, in many cases, no such legal protection exists.”​[121]​ Christine Sylvester contends that this selective pairing of anarchy/order and outside/inside may hides some patterns of patriarchy while revealing others.​[122]​   At the systemic level, then, this line of argument suggests that gender is a hidden part of the Waltzian story about the third image..
The most prominent feminist critique of system-level theorizing, however, has not focused on the potential that realist theorizing is wrong about the content of the international system per se, but instead that it is importantly and insidiously incomplete.  As Jacqui True explains, theorizing from the margins of global politics, gender lenses see that “relationships between domestic and international, masculine and feminine agents are mystified by the levels-of-analysis schema that separates the individual, the state, and the international system.”​[123]​  While other theoretical perspectives have critiqued the incompleteness of system-level theorizing,​[124]​  those approaches have mainly focused on the incompleteness of systemic theorizing. The feminist critique is different: feminists argue that the “levels” are relational rather than discrete, and that gender hierarchy is entrenched by delineating the levels as separable. In this way, feminist theorizing provides a more accurate understanding of the contingency of international structures as well as a more inclusive picture of their contents, as “feminist alternatives …do not promote more universal abstractions, but demand greater context in order to map more adequately the complexity and indeterminacy between agent and structure.”​[125]​
	While feminists have not explicitly theorized the “third-image” as independent from the others (largely, I believe, because of doubts concerning the intellectual and normative value of doing so), feminist work in IR has discussed the potential promise of understanding gender as structural in global politics, both generally and as relates to theorizing war. As I mentioned above, a number of feminists provide definitions of gender that characterize it as a structural feature of social and political life. In fact, specific articulations of gender and gender discourses differ according to context, many feminists in IR have made the argument that gendering itself is a universal feature of global politics. Feminist theorists have characterized gender as “a particular kind of power relation …central to understanding international processes,”​[126]​  and “a socially constructed relationship of inequality” that permeates global politics.​[127]​ Cynthia Enloe has explicitly described the international system as patriarchal, understanding that the international system privileges traits associated with masculinity in its units (states) and subunits (sub-state actors) in much the same way that Waltz characterizes anarchy as selecting for power and survival instincts/skills.​[128]​ If these observations that gender is (a or the) structural factor in global politics have merit, then, theorizing the third image without reference to gender creates an explanatory deficit..  
	Though it has yet to be directly articulated, feminist theorizing also provides evidence that the (Waltzian) structure of the “system” is gender-hierarchical. Waltz once observed that “in looking for international structure, one is brought face to face with the invisible, an uncomfortable position to be in.”​[129]​ Waltz read the invisibility of international structure to mean it was “the null set,” and therefore concluded that the international system Is “decentralized and anarchic.”​[130]​ Gender analysis suggests an alternative: that gender hierarchy is (an invisible) structure in the international system.​[131]​ If feminists do not ask the question “is the international structure gendered?,” they implicitly either argue that there is no international structure or that the international structure is gender-neutral, neither of which seems consonant with the theoretical and empirical innovations of feminist IR.  
Instead, feminist work in the sociology of organizations has suggested a framework for understanding gender as structural, which would mean that “advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and emotion, meaning and identity, are patterned through and in terms of a distinction between male and female, masculine and feminine.”​[132]​ Using this framework, the international system would be structurally gender-hierarchical if advantage, disadvantage, exploitation, control, action, emotion, meaning, and identity among states were distributed on the basis of perceived association with masculinity and femininity. Evidence of state identity having gendered components, inter-state interaction being premised on gendered hierarchy between states, and states’ positions and power being distributed on the basis of perceived gender characteristics supports a claim that, rather than being (or in addition to) anarchical, the international system is shaped by gender hierarchy. 
	Such an argument has potentially important theoretical implications for how IR views the third image and how third image theory accounts for war.  First, if gender hierarchy is a structural feature of the international system and a key organizing principle in dictating state identity, interaction, and relative position, then conflicts between states can be characterized as least in part as conflicts within/about the gendered order of international structure rather than conflicts over relative power and survival (exclusively). Second, and following, gender hierarchy can be seen as a/the permissive cause of war in global politics, replacing  (or complicating) Waltz’s understanding of anarchy as a permissive cause of war.  Third, and following, a gendered international structure can be seen as not only a permissive cause of war but a direct cause of war. This is because, while gender hierarchy is structural, the masculinities and femininities that are a part of that hierarchy change both in content and in relative position over time, context, and culture. Therefore, it is possible to see that gender hierarchy as a structural feature of the international system predicts state behavior differently (and potentially more precisely) than neorealist accounts of anarchy.​[133]​  Particularly, this understanding as gender hierarchy as international structure has two comparative advantages over the Waltzian conception of anarchy as structure: it could account for both war generally (a permissive cause) and wars specifically (a direct cause), and it could account for changes in the frequency and severity of war over time.​[134]​
	Whether or not the argument that the international system is gender-hierarchical develops into a feasible line of feminist inquiry and research, feminists have argued that gender analysis demonstrates the gendered nature of war, the conceptual inappropriateness (as well as empirical incompleteness) of systemic-focused analysis, and gender-based problems with the neorealist understanding of the international system as anarchical. These observations suggest that, far from adding nothing to third image theorizing of war, “putting gender in” is a crucial part of theorizing the international structure and its role in causing war. 

Gender, the State, and War: Concluding Thoughts

	Feminist IR remains relatively young, only recently entering its third decade. This newness, combined with the complexity of global politics, means that substantial work remains to be done to fully address questions of when and how gender alters the levels of analysis and/or is causal or determinative of war. Still, feminist IR has already provided a number of  “new insights, theoretical advances, [and] conceptual categories, as well as data compilations and case studies to serve as evidence that gender subordination is not merely a feature of the “empirical realities” of women’s lives or a part of the sociopolitical fabric of global politics, as Elshtain would suppose, but instead a feature that permeates every level of global social and political life. Therefore, gender analysis is (at the very least) relevant to and (likely) transformative of “man, the state, and war.” 
	While Elshtain or our mutual readers may still not find the feminist case for that gender “alters in significant ways” theorizing about war, at the end of this article at least they may decide with a fuller accounting of the arguments that feminists in IR make to shape their research program and engage in IR’s debates, rather than being required to evaluate the contributions of feminist IR to war theorizing on the basis of (partial) evaluations of feminist work that is not current and outside of the discipline of IR.  Still, Elshtain’s appraisal of the relevance of gender to IR is not wrong only because it provides an incomplete picture of the evidence or an oversimplified understanding of the arguments.  
	Instead, the question of “what does ‘putting gender in’ do, if anything?” is for IR scholars to evaluate, whether through the lenses of Waltz’s “three images” or some other framework.  As I have presented here, feminists provide evidence at the “first image” that IR’s understandings of human nature are partial and gendered, that gender analysis changes which individuals IR should pay attention to when studying “man,” and that the international is personal and the personal is international. These observations suggest a different relationship between the first image and war then either Waltz or Elshtain. At the “second image,” in addition to suggesting that domestic gender equality is actually a predictor of states’ likelihood to go to war, feminists understand that gender matters in the philosophical foundations of the state, the leadership of the state, the characterization of the state as rational and unitary, the state’s militarism, and the state’s nationalism.  Together, these observations lead feminists to see states (as actors in wars and as units in the international system) very differently than Waltz characterizes them in Man, the State, and War. Feminists have also presented evidence that gender influences war at “third image,” as an important causal and constitutive factor in the making and fighting of wars, a crucial critique of traditional theorizations of the international system, and a (perhaps the) structural feature of global politics that influences and determines war.  It is on these contributions (and others that I have inevitably left out) that the substantive value of feminist theorizing in IR  in addressing the question “why war?” should be evaluated, if it is to be measured in relationship to Waltz’s images of global politics at all.
	Still, even if gender “alters in significant ways” our understanding Waltz’s three levels of analysis, Elshtain remains unconvinced by the corrective value of feminist theorizing, criticizing feminists for naively assuming that if any level-of-analysis is gendered, “somehow we can de-gender or womanize it and it will behave differently.”​[135]​  Elshtain “cannot imagine what on earth that would mean.”​[136]​  First, it is important to note that requiring feminism to “solve” the problems of global conflict would be a double standard, considering that a number of paradigmatic approaches to theorizing war (including Waltzian neorealism) either explicitly resist “solving” problems or present impractical or theoretical problematic. Many would find that feminist theorizing “helped us account for” war if gender were necessary, conceptually, to understanding the causes of war, or important, empirically, to understandings causes and effects in the international political arena, and certainly, with evidence of both. 
That said, the alternatives that feminist theorizing in IR have presented to realist conceptions of international conflict and competition have largely been more complicated than “de-gendering” or “womanizing” IR and expecting immediate transformation.​[137]​  Feminists have suggested several theoretical alternatives to studying IR conventionally, including but not limited to gender lenses to look at global politics;​[138]​ theorizing, instead of “international relations,” “relations international” to signify the roles of characteristics associated with femininity such as relationality, interdependence, care, and emotion;​[139]​ increasing scholarly attention to the margins of global politics;​[140]​ analyzing the violent reproduction of gender and international relations;​[141]​ and representatively reformulating theories at all levels of IR that were produced as if global politics was devoid of women and femininity.​[142]​ Feminist theorists have also made a number of suggestions for integrating the insights of their research into the security sector, including but not limited to gender mainstreaming,​[143]​ integrating empathetic cooperation into global politics,​[144]​ increasing attention to values associated with femininity,​[145]​ and looking for international legal protection for women battling gender subordination.​[146]​
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